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Regulation J: How It Affects The 
Collection of Checks and Other 
Negotiable Instruments 
Overview 
Although negotiable instruments may 
be collected in a number of ways, a bank 
must act in good faith, I and use ordinary 
care2 throughout the collection process. If 
a Federal Reserve Bank (Bank) is the col-
lecting bank, it is subject to the provisions 
of Federal Reserve Board Regulation J, 
which preempts the Uniform Commercial 
Code (U.C.C.).3 The provisions of Federal 
Reserve Board Regulation J4 regarding the 
collection of checks are binding on all 
banks in the collection process of any item 
that has been handled, presented, or for-
warded by a bank. The bank, like a collect-
ing bank under the U.c.c., acts only as an 
agent in the collection of an item.s Howev-
er, the Federal Reserve Bank is an agent of 
only the sender of the item, unlike the col-
lecting bank under the U.c.c., which is 
the agent of the owner of the item.6 
This article first examines and analyzes 
Subpart A of Regulation J, which was pro-
mulgated by the Federal Reserve Board to 
govern Federal Reserve Bank check clear-
ing and the collection of negotiable instru-
ments. Secondly, the article examines the 
transfer of funds under Subpart B of Regu-
lation J. Through a discussion of Subparts 
A and B of Regulation J and the respective 
operation of each subpart, this article will 
explain the operation of the regulation and 
note aspects that are different or which 
conflict with U.c.c. §4, which also sets 
forth the duties and responsibilities of the 
collecting, depository and payor banks. 
By Robert Lorenzo Kline, III, Esq. 
Check Clearing and Collection Under 
the Federal Reserve System - Regulation 
], Subpart A 
The promulgation of Subpart A of Regu-
lation J by the Federal Reserve Board was 
designed to give the banking system a 
direct, expeditious, and economical system 
for the collection of checks. Subpart A sets 
forth the terms and conditions under 
which the Banks will receive checks for 
collection from member banks or other 
depositors, and present checks to paying 
banks. The regulation also allows Banks to 
issue operating circulars/ and procedures 
for collecting checks. The regulation and 
operating circulars are regarded as con-
tracts between the Federal Reserve System, 
its member banks and other depositors,8 
and, as specifically provided in U.c.c. § 4-
103, constitute agreements that can vary 
the effects of U.c.c. provisions concern-
ing bank deposits and collections.9 
When a non-Federal Reserve Bank sends 
a Bank a check, it authorizes the receiving 
Federal Reserve Bank and all subsequent 
collecting banks to handle the check in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Regula-
tion J and the operating circulars of the 
Bank. lo A sender also warrants its own 
authority to give authorization, and agrees 
that the provisions of Subpart A of Regula-
tion J and the operating circulars, where 
applicable, will govern the sender-bank 
relationship with respect to the handling 
of the check and its proceeds. II Each 
sender also warrants, to each Bank that 
handles the check, that it has good title to 
the check and that the check has not been 
materially altered.12 
The Bank will act as the agent of the 
check sender until the time it has actually 
received payment for the check, and has 
made the proceeds available for use by the 
sender .13 The Bank will not act as an agent 
for an owner or holder of a check other 
than the sender.14 When it presents or 
sends for presentment and payment, or 
forwards any check, the Bank warrants to 
a subsequent collecting bank and the pay-
ing bank that it has good title to the check 
or is authorized to collect it. 
A paying bank becomes accountable for 
the amount of each check received by it 
from or through a Bank if it keeps the 
checks after the close of the banking day 
on which the check is received, unless it 
pays or remits the check. IS Payment or re-
mittance is acceptable in the form of (1) a 
debit to an account on the books of the 
Bank, (2) cash, or (3) any other form of 
payment or remittance deemed acceptable 
by the Bank.16 Unless the Federal Reserve 
Bank presents the check for immediate 
payment over the counter, a paying bank 
may revoke settlement before it has finally 
paid the check if the paying bank returns 
the check before midnight of the next 
banking day following the banking day of 
receipt.17 
If the Bank does not receive payment in 
any of the stated forms, the amount of the 
check may be 'charged back' to the sender, 
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even if the check cannot be produced. 18 
Should the Bank not actually receive pay-
ment and finally collect the funds of any 
check for which it has given credit subject 
to payment, the amount of the check will 
also be 'charged back' to the sender, even 
if the check cannot be returned. 19 
Credit for checks presented for clearing 
is made through entries to member bank 
reserve accounts in accordance with a pay-
ment schedule which is published in the 
various Federal Reserve Banks' operating 
circulars. Immediate credit is given for all 
qualified regional checks, and one or two 
day deferred credit is given for checks pay-
able at banks located in other Federal 
Reserve Districts. Member banks using the 
check clearing and collection system of the 
Federal Reserve System have the option of 
charging debits and credits arising from 
check clearings to their own reserve ac-
count or to a member correspondent 
bank's reserve account. Non-member 
banks do not have the option, and must 
charge their activity to a member cor-
respondent bank's reserve account.20 
Since the time actually taken to collect a 
check may be longer than that provided 
for in the deferred payment schedule, the 
crediting of the sender's account often oc-
curs before the account of the drawee bank 
is debited. This amount of credit, repre-
senting checks not yet collected but for 
which credit has been given to the ac-
counts of depositing banks is called 
"float." Because the extension of Federal 
Reserve credit through float has a random 
effect on the availability of reserves, it 
hampers the measurement of the money 
supply. Therefore, Federal Reserve System 
operations are geared to holding the float 
to the lowest possible level by speeding up 
the check settlement process. In order to 
handle items more quickly the banks have 
developed Magnetic Ink Character Recog-
nition (MICR), which is preprinted on 
each check. Another method used by the 
Federal Reserve Board is High Dollar 
Group Sort (HDGS), which enables the 
.collecting bank to deposit checks drawn 
on a limited, preselected group of payor in-
stitutions. 
Those checks that are not handled by the 
Federal Reserve System are cleared by 
local clearinghouse associations, by large 
correspondent banks, or by direct ex-
change. However, most of the checks 
cleared in the nation enter directly or indi-
rectly into the Federal Reserve Clearing-
System after "on US"21 and locally clearing 
checks are moved. In 1979, Federal 
Reserve offices that processed checks 
handled over 15.9 billion items.22 
Case Illustration-
Wire Notification of Dishonor 
The issue of wire notification has been 
decided in a number of cases dealing with 
the midnight deadline, failure to comply 
with the wire advice requirement, and 
questions relating to potential bank liabili-
ty. In Nassau Trust Co. '0. Banker's Trust 
Co.,v a payor bank gave timely notice of 
dishonor but was not excused from liabili-
ty because the bank failed to return the 
check before the "midnight deadline." In 
Nassau, the court stated that under 12 
e.F.R. S 210.2: 
A paying bank that receives a cash 
item from or through a Federal 
Reserve Bank ... and that pays or 
remits for such item ... shall have the 
right to recover any payment or remit-
tance so made, if before it has finally 
paid the item, it returns the item 
before midnight of its banking day 
next following the banking day of re-
• 24 celpt .... 
The defendant suggested that wire notice 
of dishonor was sufficient. However, the 
"a payor bank is 
·responsible for giving 
notice of 
d·h " zs onor ... 
court deferred to operating letters issued 
by the Federal Reserve Bank, thereby 
showing support for Regulation J. The 
court in Nassau relied on the holding in 
Coloyado Nat'/ Bank '0. First Nat'l Bank and 
Trust CO.2S which stated that "wire ad-
vice" is not a substitute or alternative to a 
return of any item. Therefore, under 12 
e.F .R. § 210.12( c), a payor bank is respon-
sible for giving notice of dishonor by pro-
viding notice to the depository bank, and 
returning the item unpaid prior to the 
midnight deadline. 
In Bank of Wyandotte '0. Woodrow,26 an 
action was brought by the depository 
bank, Bank of Wyandotte, against the dra-
wer, Woodrow, who had stopped pay-
ment of his check given to plaintiff's 
customer. Woodrow counterclaimed 
agaiDst the Bank of Wyandotte for delay in 
communicating wired advice of nonpay-
ment of a separate check drawn on it 
which was payable to Woodrow. The 
court's holding stated that the Bank of 
Wyandotte might potentially be liable to 
Woodrow for the delay, however, no loss 
was found to have resulted from such 
delay. The court added, that if the bank 
had wired advice before the midnight 
deadline, notification would not have 
reached Woodrow until the following day, 
and in these exact circumstances such 
action would not have prevented the loss 
incurred by Woodrow. However, in some 
cases the Bank may not be liable for failing 
to wire advice of nonpayment as required 
. by § 210.12(cX1). Where the Bank had not 
received notice of nonpayment from the 
bank to which the check had been sent by 
the Bank and from which the check was 
returned as missent, the bank will not be 
liable for failure to comply with the wire 
advice requirement.27 
In Security Bank and Trust Co. '0. Federal 
Nat'/ Bank and Trust CO.,21 a Federal 
Reserve operating letter requiring a payor 
bank to wire notice of nonpayment of any 
item of $2,500 or more, received from a 
Federal Reserve bank for payment, was 
held to be an agreement under U.e.e. S 4-
103. It was held that the agreement altered 
U.c.e. § 4-301 for timeliness of dishonor. 
Factually, in Security Bank, the payor bank 
which received delivery of a check on 
Saturday and gave wire notice of dishonor 
of the check before midnight of the fol-
lowing Tuesday, did give notice of dishon-
or before the U.e.e. § 4-301 midnight 
deadline. However, the court held that the 
agreement between the banks altered the 
V.c.e. provisions requiring "written 
notice of dishonor."29 Thus the petitioner 
prevailed. 
Liability to Remote Parties 
Other cases have dealt with Bankliabili-
ty to remote parties. The collection aspect 
of Regulation J declares that the Bank shall 
not have, nor assume, any liability of the 
sender with respect to any item, except for 
lack of good faith or failure to exercise 
ordinary care.30 This regulation also 
defines "sender" as "a member bank, a 
nonmember clearing bank, a Federal 
Reserve Bank, an international organiza-
tion, or a foreign correspondent."31 In 
Colonial Cadi/lac '0. Shawmut Merchant's 
Bank, 32 the federal district court for 
Massachusetts, applied the provisions of 
the Regulation J. 33 The court held that the 
Bank is not liable for delayed notice of d~ 
honor to the nonbank payee of a draft that 
was sent by the payee's bank for collection 
to the Bank. The court stated that the 
Bank was not liable to the payee because 
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that party was not a "sender" under Regu-
lation J. In a similar case, the federal 5th 
circuit held that the Bank was not liable to 
the payee-depositor of a check for alleged 
negligence in collecting the check, which 
consisted of failing to give timely notice of 
return and failing to make reasonable at-
tempts to collect the amount of the 
check.34 In Childs v. Federal Reserve 
Bank,35 the court applied 12 e.F.R. § 
210.6{a)(1) stating that the Bank owed no 
duty to the owner of the item who had 
deposited the item in view of the lack of 
agency status. Childs examined the power 
of the Federal Reserve System Board of 
Governors, under 12 U.S.e. § 248(i), to 
carry out and perform its check collection 
and clearinghouse functions. The court 
concluded that Regulation J severs the 
agency relationship between a reserve 
bank and the owner of an item in the col-
lection process. 
In Appliance Buyer's Credit Corp. v. Pro· 
spect Nat'l Bank of Peoria, 36 the court ex-
amined the timeliness of wire notice and 
the liability of the Bank in relation to the 
U.e.e., while illustrating the application 
of variation of agreement between Federal 
Reserve regulations and the U .e.e. In 
Appliance Buyers, a depository bank failed 
to give timely notice of dishonor of two 
checks that had been sent through the 
Bank to a payor bank. The Bank proceed-
ed to dishonor the item. The court held 
that the depositor had to show a loss or 
damage resulting from the failure to give 
timely notice. Thus, the court ruled that 
the rule for damages for delay under 
U.e.e. § 4-212(1) was measured by 
U.e.e. § 4-103(5). More importantly, the 
court concluded that besides application of 
the U.e.e. for damages, the owner of the 
item could not maintain an action against 
the Bank for negligent handling because 12 
e.F.R. § 210.2(e) states that the Bank does 
not act as the agent for the owner, but on-
lyon behalf of the sender of the item. 
Although application of U.e.e. § 4-202(3) 
would conflict this holding, the court ap-
plied U.e.e. § 4-103 providing for the 
modification of the U.e.e. sections by 
Regulation J. Thus, the court limited the 
liability of the reserve banks by excluding 
all remote parties from obtaining damages 
directly from reserve banks for their alleg-
ed negligence in collection. 
Interaction between Regulation J and 
Uniform Commercial Code; Variation 
of Agreements - U.C.C. § 4-103 
Because, the Federal Reserve regulations, 
operating letters, and clearinghouse rules 
have the effect of agreements, whether or 
not assented to, a variety of cases have ari-
sen which illustrate application of the Fed-
eral Reserve regulations and the U.e.e. 12 
e.F.R. § 210.3(b) clearly states that rules 
for collecting items and settling balances in 
the collections of checks, under Regula-
tion J, are binding on all banks in the col-
lection process with respect to any item 
that they have handled, which have been 
presented or forwarded by a Bank. One ex-
ample where the Federal Reserve Board 
regulations have taken precedent is in the 
area of non-member banks. Although one 
may argue that non-member banks should 
enjoy the privilege of escaping the regula-
tory arm of the Federal Reserve System, 
the courts have ruled that Regulation J 
governs the collection of checks and other 
"Regulation] 
governs . . . 
co llection ... by 
member and non-
member banks." 
items by member and non-member banks. 
In Community Bank v. Federal Reserve 
Bank, 37 the Court of Appeals held that 
U.e.e. § 4-103(2) bound non-member 
banks to the 1972 amendments to Regula-
tion J. The regulation required settlement 
in immediately available funds and also ad-
vanced the time within which the payor 
bank must settle checks. This regulation 
directly conflicted with the practice of set-
tlement by draft on another bank allow-
able under U.e.e. § 4-211. The argument 
in Community Bank was that the Federal 
Reserve Board could not amend the 
U.e.e. The court in focusing on the time 
and manner of the collection of the checks 
prior to and after adoption of Regulation 
J stated: 
Prior to the amendments, payor banks 
became accountable if they failed to 
settle for demand items before mid-
night of the banking day of receipt, 
and settlements made earlier could be 
revoked prior to the midnight 
deadline. The amendments to Regula-
tion J advance the settlement time to 
the close of the banking day of receipt, 
and only if settlement is made prior to 
this time may it be revoked before 
midnight of the banking day of re-
ceipt. The amendments also affect the 
manner in which settlement may be 
made by eliminating drafts drawn on 
other banks as permissible forms of 
settlement.38 
The court reasoned that speeding up the 
process enables the Bank to pass earlier 
credit to the depositor bank, thereby re-
ducing float. Clearly, § 210.9(a) (1) of Reg-
ulation J makes the payor bank 
accountable if it fails to settle for demand 
items before the close of its banking day of 
receipt. Although there was a clear conflict 
between the California law and the Feder-
al Reserve regulations, the court recon-
ciled this problem by applying U.e.e. § 
4-103(1), which provided for the variation 
of agreements, and U.e.e. § 4-103(2), stat-
ing that, "Federal Reserve regulations and 
operating letters, clearing house rules, and 
the like, have the effect of agreements ... 
whether or not specifically assented to by 
all parties interested in the items handled." 
Agreements that can be made between 
the respective banks will be observed as 
binding under U.e.e. § 4-103, however, 
only in some instances has the defense of 
variation of agreements between banks 
been validated. In Catalina Yachts v. Old 
Colony Bank and Trust CO./9 the court ex-
amined an agreement entered into by a 
Federal Reserve Bank, a payor bank, and a 
Federal Reserve member bank, acting as a 
correspondent bank for the non-member 
payor bank. The checks were drawn on 
the payor bank and cleared through the 
Federal Reserve Bank. The checks were 
picked up each day by the corresponding 
bank, processed by the same bank's com-
puter on that day, and delivered to the 
payor bank on the following banking day. 
The agreement between the non-member 
payor bank and the correspondent bank 
altered the provisions of U.e.e. §4-
104(1)(h) and § 4-301 with respect to the 
midnight deadline for the return of the un-
paid items. The agreement, the court deter-
mined, was the type contemplated by 
U.e.e. § 4-103, which authorizes such 
agreements, thereby altering the provi-
sions of the U.e.e. 
However, in Kane v. American Nat'l 
Bank and Trust CO.,40 the Federal Reserve 
regulations and circulars were held to be 
inapplicable because the collections of 
items were not within the Federal Reserve 
collection channels and therefore did not 
relieve the payor bank of liability under 
U.e.e. § 4-302. In Bank Leumi Trust Co. 
of New York v. Bank of AfidJersey:1 a 
payor bank failed to payor return the item 
presented to it before the midnight 
deadline because of pencil marks on the 
check and an encoding error which made 
16-The Law Forum/lB.3 -----------------------------------
computer processing impossible. The 
court held that subsequent reception by a 
Bank, which failed to charge the bank's 
account, and held the item past the mid-
night deadline, and accepted the payor's 
bank's "Disclaimer of Late Return" did 
not constitute a variance of the normal 
V.e.e. §4 provisions, which displaced the 
code provisions under § 4-103(2). The 
court decided that the Bank's actions of 
not charging the bank's account with the 
amount of the check did not amount to a 
regulation, operating letter or clearing-
house rule, but was merely a balancing of 
the bank's books. Likewise, Yeiser 'V. Bank 
of AdamS'lJille"2 decided the issue of a 
payor's bank liability when a timely 
return of a check for insufficient funds was 
not accompanied by wire advice of non-
payment as required by the circular. 4J The 
Yeiser cou.rt held that the Federal Reserve 
requirement of "wire advice" was not in-
tended as a substitute or alternative to the 
return of the item, which under V.e.C. § 
4-301 was the primary method of revoking 
settlement. The court decided that the cir-
cular did not constitute an agreement 
which varied the terms of V.e.e. § 4-301, 
allowable under V.e.e. § 4-103(1) and 
(2). 
Problems 
In Subpart A of Regulation J there are 
still problems that increase the probability 
of loss for both any bank and the Federal 
Reserve System. First, float, which allows 
the private sector to gain an asset (available 
funds) in exchange for a non-interest asset 
(a deposited check from which funds are 
not available) must be decreased so the 
Treasury does not have to raise large 
amounts of revenue to replace the distrib-
uted funds.·· Hence, new amendments to 
Regulation J to shorten collection and set-
tlement time would reduce float. , 
Second, 12 e.F.R. § 210.12(c) (1) re-
quires notification of nonpayment of an 
item greater than $2,500, the previous level 
was $1,000. Before the increase in the dol-
lar limit, participation in the program was 
approximately fifty percent, whereas pres-
ent participation has decreased to only 
thirty-five percent.·5 Although there is a 
labor problem in establishing this notifica-
tion procedure, strict adherence would di-
minish the bank's exposure to risk of loss 
while maintaining the high fiduciary duty 
owed to both customers and stockholders. 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
In an effort to shorten the gap of time 
before settlement of the item, Congress 
has recently addressed a number of poten-
tial improvements to the check processing 
system in the Competitive Equality Bank-
ing Act of 1987 ("CEBA"),46 § 609. The 
instituting of methods to diminish the 
time between the notice and return of the 
item is prescribed in § 609(b)(3), which 
calls for incentives to institutions to return 
items more promptly, and in § 609(b)(4), 
which suggests automated processing of 
unpaid checks. Moving the deadline for 
settlement forward is suggested by CEBA 
in § 609(b)(6), which limits time to one 
business day in the determination of 
whether to pay the item. Sections 609(5), 
(7), and (9) focus on the desire to clear 
checks faster and make decisions regarding 
payment of items within a shorter amount 
of time by eliminating unnecessary en-
dorsements, making all checks eligible to 
be returned through the Federal Reserve 
System, and permitting returned checks to 
be forwarded to the receiving depository 
institutions. Furthermore, a direct wire 
notification coupled with the previously 
mentioned sections of CEBA would lessen 
the amount of float required due to the 
shortened time periods of settlements be-
tween banks. 
Another possible rectification of these 
problems would be to redefine "sender" in 
Regulation J so as to parallel the definition 
in the V.e.e. The redefining would make 
the bank liable to the owner of the item, 
and would effectively overrule the Childs 
"new amendments to 
Regulation] ... 
would reduce float." 
decision. Additionally, new amendements 
could be proposed that would unite the 
regulation and the V.c.e. in an effort to 
effectuate the goals of quicker notification 
and diminished risk exposure. 
Wire Transfer of Funds - Regulation J, 
Subpart B 
In electronic fund transfers the Federal 
Reserve System expands Regulation J, by 
establishing rules under which the reserve 
banks could electronically accept and de-
liver both credit and debit transfers over 
the national communication network. 
During 1979, the Federal Reserve Wire 
Network which is designed to handle sub-
stantial transfers and to discourage small 
transfers, handled 35 million transactions 
valued at $64 trillion dollars. The Federal 
Reserve System's involvement in the trans-
fer of a bank's reserve account, under 12 
U.S.c. § 248, promulgated Subpart B to 
Regulation J for the purpose of dealing 
with the wire transfer of funds. Subpart B 
sets forth the rights and obligations of 
member banks and Federal Reserve Banks 
in connection with the transfer of funds by 
wire. Subpart B, similar to Subpart A, also 
allows for the Bank to issue operating cir-
culars to govern the details of transfer of 
funds operationsY 
Transfer of Funds Vnder the Federal 
Reserve System - Regulation J, Subpart 
B 
Subpart B of Regulation J requires that 
the Bank initially request the Federal 
Reserve to collect an amount on the same 
day as the request. The Federal Reserve 
would immediately give the requesting 
bank the requisite credit to its account, 
and then use the communication network 
to notify the commercial bank that a cer-
tain amount is to be collected, thereby 
debiting the bank's reserve account. The 
Federal Reserve has various systems for 
different organizations under Subpart B: 
Fedwire, Bank Wire, Clearing House In-
terbank Payment System (CHIPS), Society 
for Worldwide International Financial 
Telecommunications (SWIFT), and Clear-
ing House Electronic Settlement System 
(CHESS). With each system there are 
three types of messages that are handled: 
transfers of reserve account balances from 
one member bank to another, transfers of 
Vnited States government and federal 
agency securities, and administrative and 
research information. The transfer of 
reserve account balances between member 
banks deals with funds derived from the 
purchasing and selling of federal funds, 
funds from correspondent bank balances 
and funds to other members on behalf of 
the customer. When transfers are made to 
the other member banks they may take 
the form of purchasing or selling of com-
mercial paper, bonds, securities, or could 
be the replenishment of corporate demand 
deposits.48 Requests can be made by tele-
phone, while advice of the transaction is 
made on the member banks' daily summa-
ry reserve statement. Each member bank 
receives daily statements detailing the pre-
ceding day's reserve account activity. If the 
transferor fails to object by written noti-
fication within ten calendar days after 
notification of the debit, the debit is deem-
ed approved by the transferor.·9 
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Case Illustration 
In Delbrueck & Co. '0. Manufacturers Han· 
over Trust Co., so the court dealt with the 
responsibility of banks to their customers 
in executing fund transfers ordered by 
telex or cable. In Delbrueck. the German 
banking partnership, Delbrueck & Com-
pany, telex-ordered its New York bank, 
Manufacturers Hanover, to transfer $12.5 
million to the account of Herstaat at 
Chase Manhattan Bank, for the following 
day. The transfer order was released by 
Manufacturers through the CHIPS system 
six minutes after an office in another part 
of Manufacturers learned of the Herstaat 
failure earlier that morning. The next 
twenty-four hours were characterized by a 
flurry of messages between Delbrueck and 
the two New York banks. Delbrueck sued 
to recover from Manufacturers for its neg-
ligence in the handling of the matter. The 
court held that there was insufficient time 
to act on the information received six 
minutes before the transfer between Man-
ufacturers and Delbrueck. Compounded 
by Delbrueck's telexing Manufacturers re-
garding another transfer, the court held 
Delbrueck contributorily negligent, re-
quiring Delbrueck to share with Manufac-
turers equally in the responsibility for 
actions taken and not taken. 
Problems 
Although the electronic fund transfer 
would aid in accelerating collection and 
settlement of items, at the same time the 
system has created some problems. Securi-
ty and error problems could be created by 
"computer criminals." Through the use of 
computers and financial sheets, computer 
oriented criminals would be able to ab-
scond with a sizeable amount of money 
and then reprogram the computer to erase 
any tracks made by the criminal. Further 
problems arise if banks implement elec-
tronic processing and transmitting of 
checks by using high-speed impulses of 
computer communication systems instead 
of checking the back of each check for sig-
nature similarities. This causes the dilem-
ma of how a computer will be able to 
detect a counterfeit electronic impulse as 
opposed to a signature. 
Besides possible malfunctioning, there 
are antitrust questions concerning access 
and participation in deciding whether 
thrift institutions, credit unions, or corpo-
rations should have direct access. How to 
set standards and formats covering the 
exchange of magnetic tape or other infor-
mation carried at the automated clearing-
house is yet to be determined. Another 
dilemma concerns the cost of exchanging 
data and similar information. Finally, the 
unresolved question of the development of 
customer indemnification agreements, 
price fixing and uniform services still re-
mains unresolved.sl In dealing with the 
malfunctions and antitrust problems cer-
tain areas can be handled by the V.e.e.: 
(1) Fixing of responsibility for MICR 
printing or encoding errors; (2) errors 
or omissions in full line rehabilitation 
ofMICR check rejects or return items; 
(3) electronic communication or proc-
essing incidents, such as: (a) omissions 
or failure to carry out instructions, (b) 
time limits for reporting errors in 
bank statements, (c) no return or paid 
items, (d) definition of item to include 
electronic debits and credits, (e) errors 
in telecommunication of related infor-
mation, and (t) validation of instruc-
tions, etc.; (4) fraud-proof iden-
tification of user and authority for the 
electronic debit order; (5) protection 
of the customer's right of privacy; and 
(6) those incidental to the long transi-
tion period when both paper and 
paperless electronic processing will be 
used .... 52 
Regarding potential computer crimes there 
are violent crimes against computer 
systems, robbery or assault of users, insid-
er crime, unauthorized use, and theft of 
valuable computer-stored assetsY 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
In an effort to reduce the potential for 
loss involved in the electronic movement 
of money, the Federal Reserve Board has 
taken several positive steps. In 1982, the 
Uelectronic fund 




items . .. " 
Federal Reserve Board established the Fed-
eral Advisory Council/Thrift Institutions 
Advisory Council Payments Systems 
Committee to consider the issue of pay-
ment system risk. In 1983, the Federal Fi-
nancial Institutions Examination Council 
adopted a uniform procedures manual for 
the examination of fund transfer 
actIVItieS of depository institutions on 
large-dollar wire transfer network. This 
new procedure is designed to disclose defi-
ciencies in the internal credit and opera-
tional controls of those institutions 
participating on the Federal Reserve net-
works. In 1984, CHIPS imposed a maxi-
mum amount of net payments it would 
accept from each of the other participants 
over CHIPS. 
The previously discussed Federal 
Reserve System measures attempt to cover 
all possible entrances and exits into and 
out of the computer. The regulation and 
constant surveillance of the wire network 
could initially deter potential abusers of 
the system until a better method can be 
employed. Although there is a statute that 
sets forth the duties and responsibilities of 
the parties, further work should be done 
in monitoring the methods of these trans-
fers through the electronic network. A 
new security system of some type would 
best serve the field of electronic transfers. 
Additionally, more case law in the above 
area would also aid in the interpretation of 
Subpart B of Regulation J because the 
trend of legislatures and courts is that wire 
transfers are not governed by the U.e.e.54 
Thus, further court determination as to 
the application and ramifications of Sub-
part B will clearly outline and define Sub-
part B of Regulation J, so to firmly set its 
effects and expected results. 
Summary 
Analysis of Regulation J through Sub-
parts A, check collection and processing, 
and Subpart B, electronic transfer of funds, 
indicates that there are still problems that 
must be addressed to decrease the risk of 
loss which the Federal Reserve Bank ex-
poses itself to in its everyday activities. To 
shorten the time gap, and thereby allow 
earlier notification and decrease the 
amount of float the Treasury is asked to 
provide, a legal restructuring of check col-
lection and subsequent transfer of funds is 
suggested. One answer to these problems 
would be the creation of a new Uniform 
Commercial Code provision, specifically 
designed to provide a legal structure of 
clearly defined general rules to govern the 
various relationships of the parties to 
paperless entries and electronic payment 
transactions between Federal Reserve 
Banks and non-member banks. The obvi-
ous advantage would be one productive 
endeavor as opposed to an attempt to add 
patches and sectionalized amendments to 
the rules. Promulgation of patchwork 
rules designed for the paper based negotia-
ble instrument payment mechanism has 
started to occur as evidenced by the Com-
petitive Equality Bank Act of 1987. Rather 
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than having the U.c.c. govern check 
processing and collection by electronic 
fund transfers, perhaps a better alternative 
would be the establishment of such a 
system by contract as designed by the par-
ties. At present, the relationship between 
the bank and its customers under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, superseded in 
pan by application of Regulation J, creates 
unnecessary problems that can be avoided 
by uniform procedures among all parties. 
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